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The Quiet Tell

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The Quiet Tell

The Ship That Pointed at the Pier

Interference scrambled a grain ship's position across the Black Sea. Bellingcat found it anyway, using the one number the satellites couldn't touch: the direction its bow was pointing.

Ines and Jonah · 23 min · 13 Oct 2026

Verified to the FactUnion StandardChecked 13 Oct 2026

About this episode

In February 2026, the Russian-flagged bulk carrier Grumant disappeared into the haze of satellite-navigation interference that covers the Black Sea. At times its reported position put it on dry land. One field in its broadcast stayed steady: the heading, which comes from the ship's own compass and not from satellites. In this first episode of The Quiet Tell, Ines and Jonah retell Bellingcat's June 2026 investigation 'Heading Off', by Youri van der Weide, Galen Reich, Yörük Işık and Bridget Diakun. Their work matched that heading to a single berth in occupied Crimea, confirmed the stay with satellite imagery, and followed the grain to Benghazi, Libya. This is a retelling of Bellingcat's published work, not our own reporting.

We explain AIS, the radio broadcast every large ship sends about itself, in plain words. We go through why a gap in a ship's signal proves nothing on its own, why the difference between regional interference and deliberate spoofing matters, and how the team checked their hunch against the other ships nearby, before-and-after imagery and an outside expert. Then we ask the uncomfortable questions: how long the method keeps working now that it's public, and what happens, or doesn't, after open-source work gets it right. At the end we give the tell in one sentence and some open datasets you can explore yourself.

Hosted by Ines and Jonah, performed by synthetic voices. Verified to the FactUnion Standard. Supported by STELQ.

Fact sheet

Every fact used in this episode, with the source it was checked against. Download the fact sheet

163 of 163 recorded lines matched the checked script.

  1. Bellingcat published 'Heading Off: New Technique Helps Track Grain Smuggling Expansion to Libya' on June 12, 2026, identifying the Russian-flagged bulk carrier Grumant as exporting grain from occupied Crimea to Libya.

    Verified

    Heading Off: New Technique Helps Track Grain Smuggling Expansion to Libya - bellingcatBellingcat publishes investigation about grain smuggling in Libya — Libya-AnalysisHeading Off: New Technique Helps Track Grain Smuggling Expansion to Libya – HCNTimes.com

  2. The Bellingcat researchers credited on the Grumant investigation are Youri van der Weide, Galen Reich, Yörük Işık and Bridget Diakun.

    Verified

    Heading Off: New Technique Helps Track Grain Smuggling Expansion to Libya - bellingcat

  3. Because of GNSS interference in the Black Sea, Grumant's AIS position data was erratic and at times placed the ship on land.

    Verified

    Heading Off: New Technique Helps Track Grain Smuggling Expansion to Libya - bellingcatNew method uses ship's compass, not GPS, to trace stolen Crimean grain to Libya - projecttHow a New Tracking Method Exposed a Hidden Grain Route From Occupied Ukraine to Libya – Sr

  4. Between February 7 and February 19, 2026, Grumant transmitted 29 AIS messages reporting a heading of 267 to 268°, which matches the 267.5° orientation of Berth 1 at the Port of Feodosia.

    Verified

    Heading Off: New Technique Helps Track Grain Smuggling Expansion to Libya - bellingcatNew method uses ship's compass, not GPS, to trace stolen Crimean grain to Libya - projecttAIS Heading Analysis: Russian Grain Smuggling to Libya - https://debuglies.com

  5. Bellingcat's AIS data for the Grumant investigation came from Lloyd's List Intelligence, and its high resolution satellite images of Feodosia and Benghazi came from Vantor, with further imagery from Planet Labs and Copernicus Sentinel.

    Corrected Not all of the satellite imagery came from Vantor: Vantor supplied the high resolution images, while Planet Labs and Copernicus Sentinel supplied other imagery.

    Heading Off: New Technique Helps Track Grain Smuggling Expansion to Libya - bellingcatPost by @bellingcat.com — Witchsky

  6. In the Vantor imagery, the ship at Berth 1 was identified as Grumant by its grey deck, seven hatches and bright yellow foremast.

    Verified

    Heading Off: New Technique Helps Track Grain Smuggling Expansion to Libya - bellingcatHow a New Tracking Method Exposed a Hidden Grain Route From Occupied Ukraine to Libya – SrNew method uses ship's compass, not GPS, to trace stolen Crimean grain to Libya - projectt

  7. Satellite imagery showed Berth 1 at Feodosia empty on February 6, 2026, before Grumant arrived, and empty again on February 22, 2026, after the ship had left the area of interference.

    Verified

    Heading Off: New Technique Helps Track Grain Smuggling Expansion to Libya - bellingcatHeading Off: New Technique Helps Track Grain Smuggling Expansion to Libya – LeftNews.netHeading Off: New Technique Helps Track Grain Smuggling Expansion to Libya

  8. Bellingcat checked the other vessels transmitting AIS near Feodosia and found Grumant was the only one that consistently matched the berth's heading during the period in question.

    Verified

    Heading Off: New Technique Helps Track Grain Smuggling Expansion to Libya - bellingcat

  9. Bellingcat consulted Charlie Brown, a former US naval officer, who validated the heading method while noting that compasses can in theory be spoofed, so the result has to be cross-referenced with other sources (paraphrase only; exact wording not verified).

    Verified

    Heading Off: New Technique Helps Track Grain Smuggling Expansion to Libya - bellingcatHeading Off: New Technique Helps Track Grain Smuggling Expansion to Libya | UANIHeading Off: New Technique Helps Track Grain Smuggling Expansion to Libya | UANI

  10. IMO guidelines describe the AIS heading input as coming from the ship's heading sensor, typically a gyrocompass, which is independent of GNSS.

    Verified

    Revised Guidelines for the Onboard Operational Use of Shipborne AIS (IMO A.1106(29))GUIDELINES FOR THE INSTALLATION OF A SHIPBORNE AUTOMATIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (AIS)GUIDELINES FOR THE INSTALLATION OF A SHIPBORNE AUTOMATIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (AIS)

  11. In AIS Class A position reports (messages 1, 2 and 3), a true-heading value of 511 means heading is not available.

    Verified

    Class A AIS Position Report (Messages 1, 2, and 3) | Navigation CenterPosition report | e-Navigation NetherlandsDATA BROADCASTED FROM EACH AIS STATION TYPE (ITU‐R M.1371‐5 Message Nr.) Not including saf

  12. Terrestrial AIS receivers have a range of roughly 40 nautical miles, while satellite AIS provides global coverage, and gaps in AIS can come from poor coverage, signal collisions or a master's legitimate safety decision rather than wrongdoing.

    Verified

    AIS: going dark, spoofing, and why a gap is not proof | Sanctioned VesselsREVISED GUIDELINES FOR THE ONBOARD OPERATIONAL USE OF SHIPBORNE AUTOMATIC IDENTIFICATION SLong range detection of automatic identification system (AIS) messages under various tropo

  13. On April 27, 2026, Kpler published an analysis arguing that the distinction between AIS spoofing and GNSS interference decides the claim.

    Verified

    AIS spoofing vs GNSS interference: Why the distinction decides the claim | KplerAIS spoofing vs GNSS interference AIS spoofing vs GNSS interference: Why the distinction dAIS spoofing vs GNSS interference: Why the distinction decides the claim

  14. On September 30, 2026, Lloyd's List Intelligence published guidance on using satellite imagery to move AIS spoofing from 'probable' to 'confirmed'.

    Verified

    From Probable to Confirmed: Using Satellite Imagery to Validate AIS Spoofing

  15. Academic assessments of AIS data report that heading is frequently missing or implausible in harbour areas, where ships may be stationary or manoeuvring at low speed.

    Corrected The evidence says ships in harbour are stationary, made fast or manoeuvring at under 1 knot; it does not mention ships swinging.

    Assessment of AIS (Annual of Navigation 19/2012, DLR)Plausibility analysis of navigation related

  16. A September 2026 arXiv study analysed AIS data from more than 367,000 vessels and identified 31 persistent anomalous hotspots in maritime traffic, at least 22 of which showed strong evidence of GPS spoofing.

    Corrected The study found 31 anomalous hotspots, and only at least 22 of them showed strong evidence of GPS spoofing, so calling all 31 GPS spoofing hotspots overstates it.

    She Spoofed Sea Ships by the Sea Shore: Measuring Large-Scale GPS Spoofing in Global MaritShe Spoofed Sea Ships by the Sea Shore: Measuring Large-Scale GPS Spoofing in Global MaritShe Spoofed Sea Ships by the Sea Shore: Measuring Large-Scale GPS Spoofing in Global Marit

  17. The Royal Institute of Navigation's 2026 maritime report surveyed 271 respondents and found that 79% had experienced GNSS interference.

    Verified

    Impacts of GNSS Interference on Maritime Safety (RIN Maritime Report)Mapping GNSS interference on shipping: From the Black Sea to the Gulf | Shipping reports |Electronic fog: GNSS interference beyond the bridge - Maritimeinfosec.org

  18. Stanford's rfi.stanford.edu platform provides ongoing, crowdsourced tracking of GNSS spoofing events worldwide.

    Verified

    Lo, Observations of Spoofing, ION ITM 2026https://web.stanford.edu/group/scpnt/gpslab/pubs/papers/Liu_ION_GNSS_2024_ADSB_Spoof_DetecA Scalable Pipeline for Real-Time Global Detection and Localization of GNSS Interference U

  19. In 2024, Kiborg News published reporting, including shipping manifests, linking Grumant to grain shipments from occupied Crimea to Syria.

    Verified

    Grumant: Схеми Фрахтування Судна для Викрадення Зерна з Окупованого Севастополя - KibOrgHeading Off: New Technique Helps Track Grain Smuggling Expansion to Libya - bellingcatTurkey let a stolen Russian ship pass through the Bosphorus under a fake name (photo) | Uk

  20. Bellingcat's May 2023 piece 'Grain Trail' used satellite imagery to track Russia's 'ghost ships' carrying grain.

    Verified

    Grain Trail: Tracking Russia's Ghost Ships with Satellite Imagery - bellingcatGrain Trail: Tracking Russia’s Ghost Ships with Satellite Imagery - Russia Theft WatchPeering Beyond the Clouds: A Guide to Bellingcat’s Ship Detection Tool - bellingcat

  21. The Libya Observer reported on April 7, 2026 that the Russian-flagged ship Grumant had arrived in Benghazi.

    Verified

    Russian-flagged ship GRUMANT arrives in Benghazi after controversial journey | The Libya O

  22. The vessel Damas Wave delivered grain from occupied Ukraine to the Libyan port of Misrata in January 2025.

    Verified

    Heading Off: New Technique Helps Track Grain Smuggling Expansion to Libya - bellingcatCrimea caller sails for Libya in Russian power play :: Lloyd's ListHow a New Tracking Method Exposed a Hidden Grain Route From Occupied Ukraine to Libya – Sr

  23. Ukraine sanctioned Grumant (IMO 9385879) on November 25, 2025, according to its GUR war-sanctions registry.

    Verified

    GRUMANT | War & Sanctions (GUR)GRUMANTGRUMANT

  24. Between March and May 2026, Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs forwarded information about Grumant's activities to diplomatic missions in the United Kingdom, Turkey and Tunisia.

    Corrected The claim says several ministries sent the notices, but the evidence says only the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did.

    New method uses ship's compass, not GPS, to trace stolen Crimean grain to Libya - projecttHeading Off: New Technique Helps Track Grain Smuggling Expansion to Libya - bellingcat

  25. Our checks found no reports of new US, UK or EU sanctions against Grumant or its owner or manager since Bellingcat published on June 12, 2026, and Grumant's sanctions entry is listed on OpenSanctions.

    Verified

    GRUMANT – OpenSanctionsHeading Off: New Technique Helps Track Grain Smuggling Expansion to Libya - bellingcatGRUMANT

  26. On October 8, 2026, the US Treasury announced 'Operation Economic Outcast', sanctioning 17 shadow-fleet vessels for transporting Iranian petroleum.

    Verified

    Operation Economic Outcast Neutralizes Iranian Regime's Remaining Shadow Fleet Network | UIran-related Designations; Issuance of Iran-related General License; Issuance of Amended ROperation Economic Outcast Sanctions on Iran’s Shadow Fleet Network - United States Depart

  27. The Kyiv School of Economics' September 2026 shadow-fleet tracker reported that shadow-fleet shipments of crude and oil products from Baltic Sea ports rose 16% while Russia's overall seaborne oil exports fell.

    Verified

    Russian Shadow Fleet Tracker – September 2026 - Kyiv School of EconomicsShadow fleet oil shipments from Baltic Sea ports rise as Russian exports decline - UkraineRussian Shadow Fleet Tracker

  28. In July 2026, Google paused an AI feature for satellite images after fears it could produce 'deepfakes in the sky'.

    Verified

    Google pauses AI satellite images, after fears of deepfakes in the sky : NPRGoogle withdraws Earth AI tool after misinformation warningsGoogle rolls back new satellite image AI tool after backlash

  29. On September 10, 2026, Columbia Journalism Review published a feature on the future of visual investigations when investigators can no longer trust their eyes.

    Verified

    The Future of Visual Investigations, If We Can't Trust Our Eyes - Columbia Journalism ReviThe Future of Visual Investigations, If We Can’t Trust Our Eyes | Policy CommonsFact-checked - page 2 - Columbia Journalism Review

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